10.4230/LIPICS.FSTTCS.2009.2330
Paul, Soumya
Soumya
Paul
Simon, Sunil
Sunil
Simon
Nash Equilibrium in Generalised Muller Games
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
2009
Article
Infinite games on graphs
Muller games
Nash equilibrium
subgame perfect equilibrium
Kannan, Ravi
Ravi
Kannan
Kumar, K. Narayan
K. Narayan
Kumar
2009
2009-12-14
2009-12-14
2009-12-14
en
urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-23304
10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009
978-3-939897-13-2
1868-8969
10.4230/LIPIcs.FSTTCS.2009
LIPIcs, Volume 4, FSTTCS 2009
IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science
2013
4
29
335
346
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Kannan, Ravi
Ravi
Kannan
Kumar, K. Narayan
K. Narayan
Kumar
1868-8969
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
2009
4
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
12 pages
122664 bytes
application/pdf
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported license
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for
players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In
this context, we look at the standard solution concept of Nash
equilibrium for non-zero sum games. We show that Nash equilibria
always exists for such generalised Muller games on finite graphs and
present a procedure to compute an equilibrium strategy profile. We
also give a procedure to compute a subgame perfect equilibrium when it
exists in such games.
LIPIcs, Vol. 4, IARCS Annual Conference on Foundations of Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, pages 335-346