10.4230/LIPICS.STACS.2010.2463
Dütting, Paul
Paul
Dütting
Henzinger, Monika
Monika
Henzinger
Weber, Ingmar
Ingmar
Weber
Sponsored Search, Market Equilibria, and the Hungarian Method
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
2010
Article
Stable matching
truthful matching mechanism
general position
Marion, Jean-Yves
Jean-Yves
Marion
Schwentick, Thomas
Thomas
Schwentick
2010
2010-03-09
2010-03-09
2010-03-09
en
urn:nbn:de:0030-drops-24636
10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010
978-3-939897-16-3
1868-8969
10.4230/LIPIcs.STACS.2010
LIPIcs, Volume 5, STACS 2010
27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
2013
5
26
287
298
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
Marion, Jean-Yves
Jean-Yves
Marion
Schwentick, Thomas
Thomas
Schwentick
1868-8969
Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics (LIPIcs)
2010
5
Schloss Dagstuhl – Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
12 pages
310054 bytes
application/pdf
Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported license
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Two-sided matching markets play a prominent role in economic theory. A prime example of such a market is the sponsored search market where $n$ advertisers compete for the assignment of one of $k$ sponsored search results, also known as ``slots'', for certain keywords they are interested in. Here, as in other markets of that kind, market equilibria correspond to stable matchings. In this paper, we show how to modify Kuhn's Hungarian Method (Kuhn, 1955) so that it finds an optimal stable matching between advertisers and advertising slots in settings with generalized linear utilities, per-bidder-item reserve prices, and per-bidder-item maximum prices. The only algorithm for this problem presented so far (Aggarwal et al., 2009) requires the market to be in ``general position''. We do not make this assumption.
LIPIcs, Vol. 5, 27th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pages 287-298